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ABSTRACT 
GABRIELLE ELIZABETH BROWN: Are Treaties the Solution to the World’s Piracy 
Problem? Using International Institutions to Defeat Blackbeard 
(Under the direction of Timothy Nordstrom)  
 
 For thousands of years, pirates have been a menace on the seas, yet somehow, 
they have also inspired generations of authors and directors to romanticize and trivialize 
their plundering in literature and film. Although piracy has generally decreased around 
the world, especially in the Western Hemisphere and European waters, it remains a 
global peril that continues to jeopardize maritime security and the commercial shipping 
industry. The economic impact of piracy may be on the decline; however, in 2017 alone, 
the economic toll of piracy in East Africa was $1.4 billion, which excludes West Africa, 
Southeastern Asia, and the Caribbean, all locations were piracy remains a critical hazard 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017). States are faced with two options when it comes to 
combating piracy: enact domestic legislation and join international institutions that 
address piracy. By examining these two paths in greater detail, this thesis will attempt to 
answer my hypothesis: the empirical question of whether or not states with increasing 
numbers of piracy incidents and attacks will join more piracy-oriented treaties. To do so, 
I will explore what contemporary piracy looks like, as well as provide a brief overview of 
how international institutions work and what piracy-oriented treaties look like in practice. 
In order to test my hypothesis, I have modified a data set from Brandon Prins’ Mapping 
Maritime Piracy Project by adding additional variables and collapsing the data. I ran 
several bivariate correlations and regressions between piracy and treaty participation 
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variables. Nevertheless, no support was determined for my hypothesis, so I decided to 
analyze two case studies to further explore the relationship between piracy and treaty 
participation. This thesis concludes that international institutions may still be an effective 
tool to combat maritime piracy, but in the future, this problem may be best solved by a 
supranational body dedicated to alone to the elimination of piracy.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Before I get into the details of maritime piracy and the political implications of 
international treaties, it is important to establish a few baseline assumptions regarding 
modern-day pirates. First off, yes, pirates are real. Though this information should not be 
ground-breaking or earth-shattering, piracy remains – even in today’s era of technological 
advantage and increased international interdependence – a legitimate threat to 
commercial vessels and thus national interests. In 2016 alone, there were one hundred 
and sixty-one reported piracy incidents around the world (Commercial Crime Services, 
2017). Next, it should be noted that from The Princess Bride’s Dread Pirate Roberts to 
The Pirates of the Caribbean’s Captain Jack Sparrow and Will Turner, pirates are often 
over-romanticized in film and literature. Though Captain Hook, Sinbad, One-Eyed 
Willie, and many others have amused people for decades, this description of pirates as 
swashbuckling tragic heroes or dastard enemies to the entertainment industry’s Peter 
Pans is misleading and fictitious. Modern-day pirates are not the fictional characters 
Hollywood would like moviegoers to believe they are. Rather, they are sophisticated 
gangs who seek survival by any means necessary. They are, indeed, a real threat to 
maritime safety around the world. 
Historically, pirates have been a menace on the seas for thousands of years with 
the earliest documented case of piracy as early as eight-hundred BC in the Mediterranean 
Sea. Thus, the longevity of piracy on the global stage begs the question: if pirates have 
been a threat to maritime safety for most of recorded history, why have they not been 
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eradicated? Though one cannot pinpoint a particular reason for the continued presence of 
pirates, it is not unreasonable to cite piracy as a failure of the international system. 
Because pirates are non-state actors who parade themselves beyond the traditional 
borders of statehood – international waters – cooperation on an international scale is 
required if pirates are to be ended for good.  
Contemporary pirates are sea-bound terrorists who use fear and violence to 
achieve a promising economic end. Due to increased globalization in all spheres, but 
particularly in the shipping industry, pirates are able to sustain themselves on the 
everflowing cargo making its way around the globe on commercial vessels. In addition, 
because most ships are forced to pass through specific choke points, they are more prone 
to ambush. These two major factors when combined with decreased maritime 
surveillance, little to no port security, political instability and corruption, and the ready 
availability of weapons, make the seas – particularly around the Horn of Africa and the 
Gulf of Aden – a breeding ground for pirates (Chalk, 2009).  
Traditionally, before the customary adoption of international law that emerged in 
the twentieth-century, pirates and slave traders were both classified as hostis humani 
generis. When translated to English, this phrase means the “enemy of mankind,” and 
quite literally, pirates were deemed to be “not only at war with the whole world but 
[were] enemies or strangers to humankind, a monster collectively lurking in the 
interstices of the global map, threatening and preying on their more properly human 
counterparts” (Greene, 2008). Similar to modern-day terrorists, pirates have no loyalty to 
one state or another, nor were they bound to borders or territories; rather, they were and 
are the enemy of all the world’s nations. Yet, due to their status as hostis humani generis, 
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any state could accuse a pirate of a crime, detain, try, and imprison said pirate, even 
though they had no true loyalty to any country. Though international law has transformed 
significantly from the days of hostis humani generis, this classification serves as the basis 
for the current treatment of not only pirates but also terrorists and hijackers. 
Now that a baseline for understanding piracy is established, for the rest of this 
thesis, I will look at state responses to the global threat of contemporary piracy. When 
attempting to combat piracy, states have two options: enact domestic legislation and join 
international institutions that address piracy. Domestic responses can range from 
outlining what piracy looks like within one’s territorial waters, the sentencing that pirates 
would face in court, or even the amount of money allocated to port security and policing. 
Meanwhile, international institutions come in many shapes and forms, but at their core, 
they are transnational bodies created to promote cooperation between states with similar 
objectives in order to overcome the ramifications of anarchy. The current belief is that 
domestic solutions are preferred to international ones, but whether or not states with high 
levels of pirate activity join international institutions that deal with piracy is an empirical 
question. I will look to see if these two factors are related in the data.  
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CHAPTER II: OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY PIRACY 
 
“The existence of the sea means the existence of pirates” – Malaysian Proverb  
  
Following the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, liberalism 
and democracy – under the wing of the United States and its NATO allies – rose to fill 
the vacuum that communism and authoritarianism left. World leaders and academics 
alike predicted that these powers would bring about a new world order governed by 
liberal principles, international institutions, and free market capitalism that left no room 
for tyrants and global violence. However, as anyone who has watched the news in the 
past twenty years can attest to, the presence of international and national security threats 
are certainly alive and well. In addition, the issues that face the global community have 
become, in many ways, less black and white and in turn more complex in that terrorism 
and other activities involve non-state actors.  
Even though the end of the Cold War may seem irrelevant when it comes to the 
issue of piracy, especially since the seas are inherently anarchic, the absence of more 
traditional security threats has allowed for the international system and the states within 
to place a new focus on eradicating non-state actors, like pirates. Particularly due to the 
unregulated nature of the open ocean, the maritime industry has been hit particularly hard 
by the general opaqueness that prevails in international politics and the escalation of new 
transnational security threats. According to the IMO, between the years 2008 and 2013,
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the number of piracy attacks worldwide increased by more than fifty percent (Jaklonski 
& Oliver, 2013). International waters are inherently anarchic as most of it lies beyond the 
jurisdiction of any one state, which prevents ample surveillance and the application of 
any domestic laws created and, in turn, promotes these violent piracy attacks on 
commercial vessels.  
Contemporary piracy threatens mariners on three fronts: ransacking of ships in 
harbor, robbery of ships in territorial water or on the seas, and the “phantom ship” 
phenomenon, when ships are out-right stolen and used for illegal trade (Chalk, 2008). At 
the low end of the spectrum, attacks against ships in harbors can be explained by 
unsubstantial security procedures at ports in countries, such as Bangladesh or Nigeria, 
that simply do not spend enough money to ensure any one ship’s safety. Typically, 
pirates of this nature are the equivalent of low-level petty thieves who seek cash and/or 
high-value items with a significant cash value that are aboard the attacked vessel. For the 
most part, these pirates use guns and knives as their main source of weaponry and are not 
seeking to kill the captain and crew, only steal their cargo. Essentially, this level of piracy 
is the equivalent of a thief breaking into a middle-class family’s house in the suburbs 
during the dead of night and stealing their flat screen TV. Meanwhile, everyone is asleep 
and Dad forgot to turn the alarm on.  
The next and most well-known form of piracy is the ransacking of vessels on the 
high seas or in a country's territorial waters. Made popularized by movies like Captain 
Phillips, which details the Maersk Alabama hijacking by Somalian pirates, this form of 
piracy involves either serious injury or the murder of a ship’s crew by a well-organized 
gang-like group of pirates who have access to modern weaponry, such as machine guns 
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or even rocket-powered grenade launchers. Typically, this mid-level form of piracy is 
carried out from a “mother ship” and can seriously affect navigation if it transpires in 
narrow, well-traveled sea-lanes, like the Strait of Malacca. Going along with the same 
robbery metaphor, this would be roughly the same as a group of well-armed thieves who 
break into someone’s home during a backyard barbeque in the middle of the day, 
completely ransack the house, and are not afraid to kill any bystander who steps in their 
way.  
The third and final category of piracy, known as the “phantom ship” phenomenon, 
can only be carried out by an extremely competent and meticulous organization as it 
involves multiple moving parts from the seizing of the vessel itself to its renaming and 
the eventual illegal selling of its materials. Pirates of this caliber want to make a profit off 
whatever materials are aboard the ship they hijack by selling the items to a third party 
buyer completely outside of where the original crew was heading toward. To equate this 
type of piracy, I have to throw the home robbery metaphor out of the window as an attack 
of this gravity would be more similar to if a truck driver was killed en route and his truck 
was not only stolen but renamed and the cargo distributed to another buyer. In this 
situation, the crime is only discovered when the cargo never reaches its original 
destination. Though this level of piracy is much rarer than the previous two, it serves as a 
prime example of how pirates have the potential to become more well-planned and 
complex in their attacks if not checked soon by either a governmental or international 
body.  
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Where and why does piracy flourish?  
Since the 1990s, most pirate attacks have been concentrated in the waters of 
Southeast Asia, particularly around Indonesia and the Malacca Straits; this region alone 
accounted for twenty-one percent of all global incidents in 2006 (Chalk, 2008). For the 
most part, the remainder of the attacks occurs around the coasts of Nigeria, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Peru, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, especially in the Gulf of Aden and the Red 
Sea, which as part of the Suez Canal connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. 
According to Chalk, there are seven main factors that have contributed to the continued 
prevalence of piracy: an increase in commercial maritime traffic, heavy use of narrow 
maritime chokepoints, lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis, more investment in 
domestic security following the events of September 11th, 2001, relaxed coastal and port 
security, corruption in a state’s criminal justice system, and the global proliferation of 
small arms. Although all of these elements combined have given rise to piracy, a lack of 
sufficient port security and the relative level of a state’s corruption are the two that have 
most significantly resulted in increased incidents and attacks in recent years as there is a 
direct correlation between them and more piracy incidents. According to Chalk (2008), if 
states see it in their best interest to put an end to piracy in their ports and territorial 
waters, they must first understand the resolve and objectives of the perpetrators, but 
potentially even more important, they should also look inward and see exactly what their 
policies are doing to allow piracy to continue to flourish.  
 
 
 8 
CHAPTER III: WHAT CAN STATES DO? 
States’ Internal Responses to Piracy  
Chalk (2008) analyzes the effects of piracy as a form of terrorism on the United 
States’ trade and foreign policy. Because the US sees commercial and political benefits 
from a stable and safe global maritime industry, diplomats and politicians should promote 
the ratification of multilateral treaties by other countries by signing UNCLOS 
themselves, conduct threat assessments at various levels of risk, update their own treaties 
and play a more active role in countering attacks, and encourage more transparency and 
communication throughout the industry. Although signing UNCLOS would be a huge 
step in the right direction for the US and the world, the US has also been instrumental in 
establishing several international and regional initiatives to improve global security in the 
realm of piracy, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Combined Task 
Force-Horn of Africa. The CSI is a series of bilateral agreements that allow for US Coast 
Guard and Border Protection officers and their foreign counterparts to prescreen 
container ships bound for and departing from US ports. Meanwhile, the Combined Task 
Force-Horn of Africa was an effort to secure the total land, air, and sea space of Yemen, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Dijoubti, Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia; a crucial component of the Task 
Force was an anti-terrorism and anti-piracy maritime patrol unit in the Red Sea, Gulf of 
Aden, and the northwestern Indian Ocean. Because US ships face the danger of piracy 
abroad, rather than in their own territorial waters, Chalk presents an institutionalist 
proposition that promotes a global effort, rather than of one county. 
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Prins, Daxecker, and Sanford (2014) focus on three factors that increase the 
likelihood of piracy in a country’s waters: relative stability of one’s government, 
economic and political opportunity for one’s citizens, and level of government 
corruption. They argue that safer countries in regards to piracy have more stable and less 
corrupt governments, as well as better economic and political opportunities. Institutional 
fragility in corrupt governments, such as Somalia and Indonesia, do not have the 
systematic ability to properly handle piracy incidents from capturing and punishing the 
perpetrators to deterring future occurrences. In addition, poverty and joblessness force 
citizens to turn to criminality as a source of income, especially if corrupt government 
officials or police officers turn a blind eye in exchange for payment. Furthermore, weak 
or underdeveloped governments have little money to spend on efforts to reduce poverty 
or increase education standards, so anti-piracy endeavors are more likely to go unfunded 
in comparison to more immediate threats. Even though increased maritime security for 
shipping vessels may reduce incidents, Prins, Daxecker, and Sanford (2014) insist that 
internal action on the domestic front, such as increased possibilities for foreign direct 
investment and policies that promote economic growth, will be more substantial in 
reducing the demand for piracy in the long term.  
Another potential variable that increases piracy is electoral competition in 
emerging democracies. According to Daxecker and Prins (2016), narrow elections, 
particularly in areas near the coasts, have the potential to alter the pre-established corrupt 
relationships between criminals and local political elites, whose position of authority is 
threatened as their party has the potential to be removed from power. In this environment, 
piracy – and other forms of criminal violence – increase as electoral competition also 
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increases. Because pirates fear that they will be unable to continue their monopolization 
of the state’s waters under an alternative regime, piracy attacks will reach a climax prior 
to a competitive election. Once again, Daxecker and Prins (2016) propose that a domestic 
solution is best to combat piracy in a state that finds itself in this predicament: as a state 
becomes more democratic, piracy will decrease. They maintain that as democratic norms 
are routinized, political figures are held accountable for their actions, and corruption is 
reduced, non-political violence, such as piracy, will decrease.  
 Bento offers a counter-argument to both Chalk and Prins, Daxecker, and 
Sanford’s solutions. Instead of a purely international or domestic approach, Bento (2011) 
insists that the plethora of international and domestic approaches to combat piracy has 
allowed piracy to thrive on a global scale because there is no presence of a unilateral, 
harmonious body of law. Because international and domestic piracy laws are often at 
odds with each other, it is increasingly difficult to capture and condemn pirates allowing 
for the practice to flourish, rather than flounder. Bento’s literature critiques various 
planes of anti-piracy efforts from the international stage (UNCLOS) and the regional 
level (ReCAPP) to the United Kingdom’s domestic framework. Bento argues that if 
uniformity and unanimity were promoted and put into place, commercial partners and 
law enforcement agencies could better synchronize their actions in order to punish the 
perpetrators and deter further attempts.  
Bento’s solutions include universal jurisdiction, the adoption of customary 
international law by all states, or the development of a comprehensive body of 
international piracy laws by way of a treaty. Ultimately, Bento declares that a body 
independent from the participation of states in “formulation, observation, and even 
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enforcement” is the only way that piracy can be monitored and eventually eradicated 
(Bento, 2011, pg. 454). Bento is arguing for a supranational institutional body that goes 
far beyond the reaches of the intergovernmental bodies that I will be detailing here, such 
as ReCAAP and UNCLOS. Although an international institution that is innately 
dedicated to piracy may be the future, sovereignty costs are a serious issue in today’s 
international environment that would inhibit a body of this gravitas from emerging. 
Whether this universal body is the solution or not, the reality is that it would seriously 
constrain state sovereignty and would not be a popular response today.  
 
What are institutions and treaties and how do they work?  
Before returning to piracy directly, I need to discuss international institutions 
generally and how they work to accomplish their goals. One of the main assumptions of 
both Political Realism and Liberalism is the idea that the international system is 
inherently anarchic because of the lack of institutions that monitor and influence a 
sovereign state’s behavior. Realists see anarchy as the reason for conflict between states 
because it fosters an environment of mistrust, which leads to the security dilemma and a 
failure of bargaining that results in conflict. However, Liberals argue that the negative 
effects of anarchy can be limited by the creation and implementation of institutions. 
Therefore, at their core, institutions are international bodies designed to attempt to 
overcome the international system’s anarchy by promoting mutual cooperation between 
states.  
Formally, international institutions are “relatively stable sets of related 
constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international 
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system, the actors in the system, and their activities” (Duffield, 2007, p. 2). Though this 
definition may seem vague, institutions are purposely hard to define because they often 
combine multiple elements and goals into one all-encompassing organism. Even though 
institutions can be created to address a wide array of issues, all institutions are durable, 
resilient to change, and are codified, either formally or functionally (Duffield, 2007). 
Codification is a crucial component of institutions because in order to accomplish some 
desired outcome their rules need to constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe 
roles for the actors involved (Keohane, 1988). In addition, institutions act in response to 
states’ interests and are created because of their ability to constrain members’ behavior to 
bring about some desired goal. In order to do so, institutions can provide information, 
reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, and establish focal points for 
coordination (Keohane and Martin, 1995). As a result of information sharing between 
states, reciprocity and iteration among members are fostered, which harbors further 
mutual cooperation and overcomes the free riders problem. Therefore, institutions are 
international bodies created to overcome the anarchic international system that use rules 
and norms to alter an actor’s behavior.  
 Meanwhile, treaties or international agreements are a type of public international 
law that are used to build and solidify relationships with other states and to influence the 
behavior of those states (Kavanagh, 2014). Treaties can either be bilateral (an agreement 
between two states, e.g. the Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel in 
1978) or multilateral (an agreement between three or more states, e.g. UNCLOS). The 
most important part of a treaty is that it formalizes the relationship between states through 
its signature, so if a state does not ratify and eventually sign a treaty, it is not expected to 
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adhere to its principles. However, once a treaty is signed, it becomes a part of 
international law and is expected to be upheld by the signatories. International institutions 
are bodies created to reign in anarchy by promoting cooperation between states, but 
treaties are actual binding agreements made between one state’s government and another 
that defines expected behavior and interactions between the two. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that treaties and intergovernmental organizations are subsets of 
international institutions, so all treaties and intergovernmental organizations are 
international institutions but not vice-versa.  
If eradicating piracy on the high seas is a public good that benefits the commercial 
interests of the entire world and only seeks to harm the pirates themselves, why do states 
need international and regional treaties to stipulate exactly guidelines on how to stop the 
problem? Why would a state, like Somalia, that is constantly ravished by pirate attacks 
not institute their own domestic agenda to combat aggressors? Because the absence of 
pirates is a good that is non-excludable and non-rival, the collective action and free rider 
problems prevail. To overcome these issues, states with a common interest can either 
align themselves formally with treaties or look to institutions to promote cooperation and 
compliance through mutual accountability.  
For example, when a state realizes that war is imminent, they look to their trade or 
cultural allies to join them in formal military alliances that go beyond the scope of mere 
partnerships. An alliance requires a credible commitment from the states involved and 
formalizes obligations between the parties by tying them to each other in some written 
document. Because commitment allows for allied states to be potentially more successful 
in war than if they were to fight alone, as well as invokes audience costs if a state were to 
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not adhere to said alliance, the value of intervention and coordination outweighs the value 
of staying out of it (Morrow, 2000). By formalizing a piracy treaty, whether that be on 
the international stage or on a regional level, states are committing themselves to 
whatever is agreed upon within the treaty. Treaties allow for interests and resources to be 
combined to more efficiently combat piracy than if individual states were to make the 
same attempts alone. In addition, the audience costs of not adhering to the agreed upon 
policies outweigh backing out of an agreement of this caliber as a state’s credibility on 
the international stage would plummet and other states would not pursue future treaties 
with that nation.  
 When circumstances arise that require allies to act on their prior commitments, 
states usually come to the aid of their allies and fulfill their promises because alliances 
are more than scraps of paper that can simply be ignored (Morrow, 2000). Rather, when 
alliances are formed, states ensure on the front end that the responsibilities they make are 
reasonable and can actually be filled. Alliances are not blanket agreements but are 
specific to each relationship and denote certain actions that should take place under 
particular circumstances (Leeds et al, 2009). The specificity of alliances, institutions, and 
treaties allows for high levels of compliance among member states and, in turn, furthers 
cooperation between the signatories. However, the positive rates of compliance are 
overshadowed by the reality that most agreements and treaties require states to make only 
modest adjustments from what they would have done in the absence of the institutions 
(Downs et al, 1996). Therefore, from the outside looking in, a state may appear to be 
doing everything in their power to condemn the actions of pirates, but in all actuality, 
they are maintaining the bare minimum to avoid condemnation by their allies.  
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When it comes to piracy treaties, the same principle of specificity rings true as 
states that were included in the negotiation process will more likely adhere to and honor 
the commitments made in the agreements. However, this can be a double-edged sword as 
states that were not included in the initial creation of the treaties may find it harder to 
fully cooperate because their interests were not included in the original conversation. For 
example, Japan and the Republic of Korea are two of the Asian nations that formulated 
and founded ReCAAP, so they should have few grievances when it comes to following 
through with the organization’s agenda. However, Western countries, such as the United 
Kingdom or the United States, joined ReCAAP in the years after it was instituted and 
potentially could deviate from the guidelines the agreement specifies because they see 
their interests as not being represented.   
 Ultimately, states come together to create these treaties and write their alliances 
down because they deter actions deemed harmful from occurring, such as piracy 
incidents. Diplomatic means in themselves without physically putting pen to paper is 
worthless as there is no mechanism to hold those states accountable for their actions. By 
signing some agreement, the states involved are sending a credible signal to their allies 
that they are willing to take on the costs of whatever is agreed upon, such as more port 
security or more funding for search and rescue operations.  
 
Why do states join institutions?  
Though political scientists disagree on a single, specific theory that explains why 
states join institutions, they all maintain that domestic institutions by themselves cannot 
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solve all of the problems that the world faces, therefore, states join institutions to help 
address some of these issues, such as piracy.  
  Functionalism  
Since their creation, international institutions have been centralized and organized 
around David Mitrany’s theory of Functionalism, which claims that the world is and will 
be plagued by a series of technical issues that can only be solved through cooperation 
across state boundaries and by highly trained, apolitical specialists or technicians 
(Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1996). Functionalism is rooted in the assumption that state 
governments are either too busy with their own domestic issues or too self-absorbed with 
power and politics to be concerned with grand-scheme welfare issues that affect the 
entire world. Therefore, international organizations must exist to handle these problems, 
but a state must be willing to give up some of their nation’s sovereign to international 
penetration for these function-based institutions to function properly (Miller, 1971). Once 
a state permits an institution to take on some of their responsibility, issues are resolved in 
regards to a specific need or function, i.e. piracy prevention, and eventually, with 
repeated interaction and the building of trust, the incentive for mutual cooperation within 
some other unrelated subsection is increased. This process of institutions creation based 
on function, issue resolution, frequent interaction, and mutual trust has repeated over time 
across a wide spectrum of issues and has resulted in the institutional web of the modern-
day international system.  
 Rational Design  
 Though the international system has a wide variety of institutions organized in 
drastically different ways and created to address countless unique problems, one thing all 
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institutions have in common is that are initiated and designed by states to achieve some 
goal (Koremenos, Lispon, and Snidal, 2001). The commonality of state fabrication is the 
main assumption behind the rational design institutionalist theory. According to this 
model, states use diplomacy and conferences to select new institutional features to further 
their collective and individual goals. Therefore, even though institutions may vary in 
membership selection, their scope, or flexibility, their claim to the title institutions is 
based in their direct relationship to a state (or states’) interest. Because the wants and the 
needs of the international community are always evolving, the rational design approach 
gives flexibility to the world’s institutional web as institutions are forced to adhere to one 
rigid configuration. A prime example of rational design in practice is how most 
international trade agreements include some type of escape clause that allows for the 
countries involved to back out of the agreement down the road. Though this clause many 
reduce a state’s credibility, Rosendorff and Milner (2001) would argue that it highlights 
the flexibility of institutions to reflect domestic demands. The bottom line is that 
institutions are formed and codified in direct response to states’ preferences.  
Efficiency Maximization  
The unique designs of institutions make them both centralized and independent at 
the same time. Centralization can be defined as a concrete, stable organizational structure 
with an administrative apparatus that manages collective activities, while independence 
means that they can act with a degree of autonomy to a certain extent (Abbott and Snidal, 
1998). These two factors allow for institutions to be the ideal efficiency maximizers for 
cooperation at the international scale because although they are ultimately rooted in 
states’ interests, they are able to act coherently and on their own terms. Institutions are 
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inherently in tune with the desires of states but are not bogged down by constraints that 
come with domestic politics. In addition, similar to the functionalist approach, institutions 
are able to act as neutral parties once established, so although they can act as short-cuts 
for state’s interactions, they are also specialized and facilitate reciprocity and iteration 
between states. Therefore, institutions allow for states to achieve goals impossible in a 
decentralized structure and, at the same time, have independently redefined international 
norms and practices.  
 Domestic Political Institutions  
Similar to the argument behind the Democratic Peace, states’ with democratic 
domestic political institutions are more likely to establish, join, and remain in 
international institutions because democracies are centralized around the norm that 
conflict is resolved through peaceful cooperation between disagreeing parties, rather than 
through physical confrontation. Even though leadership turnover rates are far higher in 
democracies than in other forms of government, domestic institutional constraints, such 
as checks and balances in the US’s three branches of government, prevent new leaders 
from altering foreign policy preferences drastically (Leeds, Mattes, & Vogel, 2009). 
Meanwhile, non-democracies are much more likely to change their stance on the 
international front because their leadership changes usually come with different societal 
bases of support. Once a democracy comes out in support of and joins an institution, their 
institutional constraints make it essentially impossible to completely retract their support. 
Furthermore, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2008) argue that when countries are going 
through the process of democratization they are more likely to join international 
institutions as it allows for leaders to send a credible signal to the international 
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community that he or she is serious about making liberal domestic reforms. Evidently, 
there is some inherently unique relationship between democratic governments and 
international institutions that compels democracies to continue to support the efforts these 
bodies attempt to reign in.  
 
An Overview of Piracy-Related Treaties  
International Maritime Agreements  
The goal of this component is to highlight the importance of particular 
international agreements and organizations that have molded the modern attempt to 
define and eradicate piracy: UNCLOS, UN Hostages Convention, and the IMO.  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
Though there are other historical attempts to address piracy at the international 
level, such as the League of Nations and the 1958 Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS serves 
as the primary international level source related to piracy. With one hundred and sixty-
one state signatories and the support of the European Union, UNCLOS is the legitimate 
cornerstone of modern-day international maritime law. By codifying and combining 
previous endeavors in one document, UNCLOS continues to be the only all-inclusive 
document on marine affairs. Because UNCLOS is a codification of customary 
international law, it is binding to every state even non-parties to the convention, such as 
the US. Though UNCLOS encompasses a wide array of maritime issues, piracy is 
specifically addressed in Articles 100 – 107. According to UNCLOS Article 101, piracy 
consists of any of the following acts:  
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft, and directed: 
 (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). (UNCLOS, 1982, pp. 60 – 61.)  
 
Through this expansive definition, UNCLOS promotes new norms relating to the ways in 
which states address piracy. Traditionally, because piracy happens outside the confines of 
a state’s boundaries, pirates, for the most part, have escaped prosecution by individual 
nations. However, UNCLOS redefines the role states should play when piracy comes into 
the picture because it establishes and insists that states have the responsibility and the 
authority to take actions against piracy. UNCLOS specifically stipulates that signees have 
universal jurisdiction on the high seas to seize any and all vessels that are potentially in 
the possession of pirates and arrest those who are committing the crimes. However, this 
authority does not extend to a state’s territorial waters, which is defined as twelve-
nautical miles from the coast, so in a state overrun by piracy, such as Somalia, UNCLOS 
does not allow another state to interfere within Somalia’s own territorial waters, a 
condition which seriously weakens the document.  
UNCLOS has had a significant impact on both other international maritime 
institutions and individual nation’s domestic policies. For example, rather than create an 
entirely new definition, several institutions, like the IMO, use the same definition of 
piracy that UNCLOS codified years prior to the IMO’s creation and simply expanded 
upon the previously agreed upon stipulations. The same goes for domestic piracy 
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legislation: states are encouraged to use UNCLOS as a baseline for outlining piracy and 
then elaborate upon it in any way they deem appropriate.  
 
International Convention against Taking of the Hostages 
 After a series of hostage deaths in Europe and Africa in the late 1970s, the UN 
decided that it was necessary to address a gap in international law: hostage-taking outside 
of armed-conflict and war. By reaffirming the importance of human life and associating 
hostage-taking with a breach of international law, the document sought invoke 
widespread international responses for crimes of this gravity. In Article I, the convention 
defines “hostage-taking” as:  
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the “hostage”) 
in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international 
intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of 
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of 
hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of this Convention. (UN 
Hostages Convention, 1979).  
 
By signing the UN Hostages Convention, each state is required to make the offense of 
hostage-taking one that is punishable, take all measures necessary to deescalate the 
situation, secure the release of the hostages, and return them safely to their home country, 
and ultimately cooperate with other countries when it comes to situations of hostage-
taking. Though the UN Hostages Convention never specifically address piracy, it is 
reasonable to apply this definition of hostage-taking to acts of piracy, especially as it is 
not uncommon for pirates to capture ships and their entire crews. As the modern-day 
Somalian pirates off the coasts of Africa highlight, when pirates seize maritime vessels 
and those aboard, they often threaten to end their lives if a ransom is not upheld from the 
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home-country of the hostages. Therefore, by placing piracy under this broad umbrella of 
hostage-taking, more international intervention can take place. Though a country may not 
want to interfere in general acts of piracy, when their own people become hostages in 
addition to victims of piracy, they are further motivated to intercede. Essentially, the UN 
Hostages Convention serves as another mechanism for states to detain and condemn 
piracy as a crime like kidnapping or hostage-taking, which could be more easily proven 
in court and is still a legitimate path to punishing pirates in countries that do not have 
laws that specifically condemn piracy.  
International Maritime Organization  
Established in 1948 as the Inter-Governmental Marine Consultative Organization 
(IMCO) and later renamed, the IMO is a UN specialized agency with the goal “to 
promote safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through 
cooperation” (IMO, 2018, pp. 3). Rather than rely on individual states to set their own 
benchmarks relating to maritime security or ocean pollution, the IMO sets out to improve 
sea safety by implementing international regulations that all member states are required 
to meet. The IMO targets pirates from two different approaches: (1) piracy as defined by 
UNCLOS, which can only occur on the high seas, and (2) armed robbery at sea, which 
can only occur within a country’s territorial waters. By designing initiatives specifically 
to address these two distinct areas, piracy can be more efficiently contained and 
condemned.  
Under the broad umbrella of the IMO, numerous conventions have been called to 
address certain grievances, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), which outlines basic requirements for states when it comes to the 
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construction of ships and the types of safety equipment they should carry. For piracy 
specifically, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) is an 
amendment to SOLAS that details the mandatory specifications that each state must 
follow when it comes to the safety of port facilities following 9/11. For example, under 
ISPS, each vessel must have a designated Company Security Officer and Ship Security 
Officer whose jobs are solely to ensure of the safety of the ship and keep the captain and 
crew informed of any potential security threats.  
Since 1982, the IMO has issued collective piracy and armed robbery incident 
reports each year that investigate all the submitted incidents that are relevant to its 
member states. Beginning in 2002, the IMO’s reports began to distinguish between 
attempts of piracy (international waters) and armed robbery (territorial waters) to better 
inform the maritime community as a whole. In addition, the IMO has been a crucial 
component in instituting and providing resources to various regional agreements 
regarding piracy, such as ReCAAP and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Out of the three 
international-level treaties and organizations that this thesis highlights and collected data 
on, the IMO has the highest level of membership with one hundred and seventy-four 
member states actively adhering to its policies.  
Regional Maritime Agreements  
 This section highlights the regional maritime agreements that have attempted to 
stifle piracy in the world’s most dangerous areas for sea travel: the South Pacific and 
Eastern Coast of Asia (ReCAAP) and the Gulf of Aden, the Western Indian Ocean, and 
the Eastern Coast of Africa (DCoC).  
 24 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia  
As the first regional government-to-government agreement that promotes 
cooperation and coordination in response to piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
Asia, ReCAAP is a crucial component of piracy prevention in this region. Founded in 
2006 with fourteenth South, North, and Southeast Asian contracting parties, ReCAAP has 
expanded its reach to six more nations beyond Asia, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Norway. ReCAAP’s main focus is to provide information and 
educational resources for its member states in hopes that piracy can be averted. In order 
to accomplish this task, ReCAAP is centered around three main pillars: information 
sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangements. Due to its presence around 
much of the world, ReCAAP is able to use its resources to extend the knowledge of 
piracy occurrences to stakeholders and other organizations, such as the IMO, through 
weekly updates, special reports, and guides. Next, each contracting party has the 
opportunity to participate in meetings and workshops with the aim to promote 
cooperation and foster trust within the maritime community. Finally, ReCAAP has signed 
various cooperative arrangements with particular international organizations, 
governmental agencies, and other members of the maritime world from the IMO and 
INTERPOL to the Asian Shipholder’s Association and the Djibouti Code of Conduct.  
Since ReCAAP’s founding, piracy incidents and attacks in Southeast Asian have 
steadily declined, so much so that there were only seventy-six total incidents in the region 
in 2018, which is a ten-year low (ReCAAP ISC Annual Report 2018). If the states 
already involved could somehow convince Indonesia and Malaysia – the Southeast Asian 
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countries most affected by piracy – to ratify the agreement, I would argue that piracy 
would be nearly eradicated in the region because all states would be cooperating fully, no 
information would be lacking, and all of the states would benefit from the additional 
funding, supplies, and surveillance.  
The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct ) 
 Written with the intention to address the threat of piracy and to provide a 
framework for capacity building in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, the 
DCoC was first signed in 2009. Since its installation, twenty of the twenty-one eligible 
states have signed the DCoC, such as Kenya, Madagascar, Egypt, and Comoros. Similar 
to ReCAAP, DCoC focuses on transnational communication, coordination, and 
cooperation by maintaining four pillars: national and regional training, enhancing 
national legislation, information sharing, and building up counter-piracy methods and 
capacity. In addition, as a regional subsect to the IMO, the DCoC states work hand-in-
hand with the institution to foster a more effective and safe relationship between states 
and intergovernmental institutions. By specifically targeting states that are more prone to 
piracy, such as Somalia, and encouraging a build-up of their maritime sector, piracy has 
been significantly reduced in the region. In addition, as part of the agreement, all 
signatories had to reevaluate their domestic legislation on piracy to ensure that piracy and 
armed robbery against ships are criminalized to some extent and adequate provisions are 
in place to detain and punish the offenders.  
In 2017, the DCoC states came together to analyze their progression over the 
previous eight years and decided to revamp and extend their efforts to more general 
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maritime security issues. Known as the Jeddah Amendment, the new and improved 
DCoC implores states to cooperate to a greater extent in preventing transnational 
organized crime in the maritime sector beyond the scope of piracy and armed robbery of 
ships alone: trafficking narcotics, maritime terrorism, unregulated fishing, etc.  
So what can states do in response to piracy?  
States can combat piracy on two fronts: by enacting domestic policies or by 
joining international institutions. Ultimately, I am not claiming that either hypothesis is 
the perfect answer for how to combat piracy, but rather, we should look to the data to 
answer the empirical question of what states should do to eliminate pirates.  
1. Domestic Responses  
Hn: States with an increasing number of piracy events will enact domestic policies to 
combat issues in their own territorial waters, rather than join institutions and cooperate at 
the international level.  
2. Join Institutions that Address Piracy  
H1: As a state experiences an increasing number of piracy attacks, it will be prompted to 
join more international institutions and sign additional treaties and agreements in order to 
stifle the effects of piracy.  
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS 
Research Design 
To test my hypothesis regarding the relationship between piracy attacks and the 
number of piracy-oriented treaties a country signs, I manipulated the piracy data from 
Brandon Prins’ Mapping Maritime Piracy Project. The Mapping Maritime Piracy Project 
is a collection of piracy research spearheaded by Prins and his team of scholars with the 
common goal to provide a holistic approach to understand the efforts of states in dealing 
with pirates. In the aforementioned data set, Prins’ uses the country-year format as the 
unit of his analysis and measures years 1995 to 2013. Because each country (one hundred 
and twenty-two countries total) was included over a nineteen-year period, the data set has 
a total of two thousand four hundred and one observations, which look at a series of 
variables in one country in any given year. For example, the Netherlands is country-code 
two hundred and ten and has nineteen rows of data of all variables from the years 1995 to 
2013. In order to more efficiently and generally analyze the data, I took the approach of 
collapsing the set from two thousand four hundred and one observations to one hundred 
and twenty-two observations. Now, each country has one row of data opposed to the 
original nineteen. To collapse the data, variables were reduced by two different methods: 
(1) the variable with the highest value and (2) the variable’s mean. 
The piracy data, however, did not included any data on treaty membership, so I 
added variables for participation, the five piracy-oriented treaties previously discussed at 
length (UNCLOS, the UN Hostages Treaty, the IMO, ReCAAP, and the DCoC) to the 
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data set for each year. In Prins’ variables, each country either receives a zero or one, 
which represents if the country was a signatory or not. From the data, I created two 
additional variables: one that looks at the total number of treaties in a given year and the 
other that looks at the total number of regional treaties in a given year. In this new data 
set, I limited the variables to the number of treaties, major power, democracy, GDP per 
capita, government effectiveness, government corruption, piracy incidents, piracy attacks, 
and piracy attempts. The variables are as follows:  
• IMO: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was a member of the IMO at 
any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one  
• ToH: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was a member of the ToH at 
any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one  
• UNCLOS: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was a member of 
UNCLOS at any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one  
• DCoC: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was a member of the DCoC 
at any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one  
• ReCAAP: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was a member of 
ReCAAP at any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one 
• Total number of treaties signed: a variable measured between zero and five; if a 
country was a member of all five treaties at any point during the data coverage, 
the maximum would be five 
• Total number of regional treaties signed: a variable measured between zero and 
two; if a country was a member of both treaties at any point during the data 
coverage, the maximum would be two 
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• Major power: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was deemed a major 
power at any point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one 
• Democracy: a variable measured zero or one; if a country was democracy at any 
point during the data coverage, the maximum would be one 
• Government effectiveness: a variable that measures the average government 
effectiveness of a country from 1995 – 2013 
• Government corruption: a variable that measures the average government 
corruption of a country from 1995 – 2013 
• GDP per capita: a variable that measures the average GDP per capita in a country 
from 1995 – 2013 
• Piracy incidents: a variable that measures the average number of piracy incidents 
a country experienced from 1995 – 2013. Piracy incidents are the total number of 
piracy attacks combined with the total number of piracy attempts.  
• Piracy attacks: a variable that measures the average number of piracy attacks a 
country was involved in from 1995 – 2013. A piracy attack is defined specifically 
as when violence is used against a ship or its personnel to board or rob the vessel 
and/or kidnap the personnel.  
• Piracy attempts: a variable that measures the average number of piracy attempts a 
country was involved in from 1995 – 2013   
 I use the data collected to generate descriptive statistics about the variables and 
bivariate correlations between my key variables: piracy and participation in the treaties. 
In addition, I decided to supplement these with two types of regressions. Finally, I 
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examine two case studies to shed additional light on the ideas about piracy and treaties 
that I have assessed throughout this thesis.  
 
Data Analysis 
  Tables 1 – 3 are descriptive statistics with the main goal to summarize the data 
collected. Table 1 looks specifically at the treaty variables from the individual treaties 
themselves to the total number of treaties signed and regional treaties signed. As the table 
highlights, membership is highest in the IMO; both of the regional treaties, the DCoC and 
ReCAAP, have extremely low levels of participation, which can be explained by the fact 
that many of the one hundred and twenty-one countries are outside these specific regions. 
Table 2 describes all of the variables dealing with the piracy. Although Table 2 illustrates 
that the maximum number of piracy incidents or attacks is relatively high – 69.89474 and 
56.36842 respectfully – these numbers may be skewed and over representing one country 
or a small group of countries, as the average for both of these variables for all countries is 
low in comparison – 2.196607 and 1.687255. Table 3 sheds light on the data set’s control 
variables, such as the variation that exists between countries when it comes to 
government corruption and effectiveness. As the tables expand upon, there is some minor 
variation among the number of observations for each variable, but considering the largest 
variation is only three observations, it was determined to be small enough to be trivial. 
Rather than use these tables to draw major conclusions about my hypothesis, the 
descriptive statistics tables merely display the information gathered in a concise manner, 
which is why the next set of tables in necessary to determine the extent of any correlation 
between piracy and the number of piracy-oriented treaties a country signs.  
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Table 1 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
IMO 121 0.9752066 0.1561415 0 1 
ToH 121 0.8842975 0.3211978 0 1 
UNCLOS 121 0.9173554 0.2764892 0 1 
DCoC 122 0.1639344 0.3717427 0 1 
ReCAAP 122 0.1639344 0.3717427 0 1 
tot2 121 3.090909 0.7637626 0 5 
tot3 122 0.3278689 0.5213242 0 2 
 
Table 2 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Pirincidents 121 2.196607 7.54431 0 69.89474 
Pirattacks 121 1.687255 5.785933 0 56.36842 
Pirattempts 121 0.508047 2.315996 0 21.10526 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
majpow 121 0.0578512 0.2344327 0 1 
demdum 120 0.6583333 0.476257 0 1 
newgoveffect 120 49.17252 29.17643 0.4077724 99.07109 
corruption 120 48.06794 28.73103 0.8401085 99.729 
lngdpcap 118 8.128382 1.581626 4.956551 11.03636 
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 Tables 4 – 7 offer a different approach to looking at the data collected: bivariate 
correlations. In a bivariate analysis, a correlation is conducted to determine whether or 
not there is a significant relationship between two variables. These results vary from 0 
(no relationship) to 1 (perfect linear relationship) or -1 (perfect negative linear 
relationship. Thus, if the result of the correlation is a positive coefficient, there is a direct 
relationship between the variables, but if the result is a negative coefficient, there is an 
indirect relationship. The four tables in this section look to see if there is any correlation 
between two of the piracy variables (piracy incidents and piracy attacks) and the two total 
treaties variables. Table 4 is piracy attacks and the total number of treaties signed. Table 
5 is piracy incidents and the total number of treaties signed. Table 6 is piracy attacks and 
the total number of regional treaties signed. Table 7 is piracy incidents and the total 
number of regional treaties signed. In each of these bivariate correlations, the results were 
a weak negative relationship between the two variables. In regards to my hypothesis, the 
correlations yield no support. 
Table 4 
 pirattacks tot2 
pirattacks 1.0000  
tot2 -0.1311 1.0000 
 
Table 5 
 pirincidents tot2 
pirincidents 1.0000  
tot2 -0.1544 1.0000 
Table 7 
 pirincidents tot3 
pirincidents 1.0000  
tot3 -0.0717 1.0000 
Table 6 
 pirattacks tot3 
pirattacks 1.0000  
tot3 -0.0580 1.0000 
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 Furthermore, I also performed some more advanced statistical analysis in hopes 
that results would be positive. The tables for these results (Table A-1, Table A-2, Table 
A-3, and Table A-4) are in the appendix. In a final attempt to test my hypothesis, I ran a 
multivariate regression. In a multivariate regression, the goal is to extend the bivariate 
linear regression by incorporating additional variables to control for things that might 
also be correlated with the outcome variable. To accomplish this, I manipulated the same 
independent and dependent variables from the earlier correlation – piracy incidents, 
piracy attacks, total number of treaties signed, and total number of regional treaties 
signed, but also added the control variables from the descriptive statistics tables – GDP, 
government effectiveness, and democracy. Yet again, the regressions yielded no support. 
Although most of the data analysis proved futile, a positive relationship could still exist 
between the number of piracy occurrences a country experiences and the number of 
piracy-oriented treaties they sign, which is why my step is to look at case studies of two 
countries that are currently dealing with the threat of piracy.  
 
Case Studies  
Given that the quantitative data analysis showed little support for my hypothesis, I 
looked at two countries more closely to see if they could shed light on why the 
relationship I posited is not supported. Do to so, I examined two Southeast Asian 
democracies that have seen a staggering number of piracy incidents and attacks since the 
mid-1990s: India and Indonesia.  
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India 
As the world’s second most populous country (the most populous democracy) and 
a nuclear-armed, economic powerhouse, India plays a crucial role in promoting liberal 
values in the region. As one of the founding members of the UN, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the G-20 and the sole founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, India 
is a major player in both the Asian and international communities. In addition, alongside 
Germany, Brazil, and Japan, India is one of the G4 nations currently advocating for a 
permanent seat on the UN security council. As far as maritime security goes, India is a 
signatory of UNCLOS and UN Hostage Treaty and is a member state of the IMO and 
ReCAAP. Even though India is a globalized economy and has made credible steps on the 
international stage to reduce piracy, pirates are still a threat to the safety of Indian and 
foreign merchant vessels as two Indian ports –  Sikka and Kandla –  are currently on the 
Commercial Crime Services piracy warning areas (ICC: CCS, 2017).  
Between the years of 1998 and 2005, there was a peak in the number of piracy 
incidents and attacks near Indian waters. In 2006, following India’s signature of ReCAAP 
alongside other Asian and Oceania nations, such as Japan and Australia, the number of 
piracy incidents in the entire region decreased by twenty-five percent since the previous 
year (ReCAAP: Report for Dec. 2006). Over the next few years, the specific numbers 
fluctuated, but for the most part, general trends showed that piracy in the region was 
decreasing rapidly and the presence of ReCAAP could potentially be the explanation for 
why. However, beginning in 2008, Somalian pirates began inching their way closer to 
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Indian waters, increasing the occurrence of piracy once again. Though it is often 
forgotten how close the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia is to the Middle East 
and Africa, it is important to note that the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean are the only 
bodies of water that separate India from the Somalian piracy hotbed that is rooted in the 
Gulf of Aden. Therefore, when Somalian piracy began to seriously threaten the maritime 
transport industry, India increased its naval presence in the region to promote stability; 
however, this decision created a security dilemma for the area’s pirates, which caused 
some of them to turn their efforts further to the south and east, right in India’s backyard 
(Murthy, 2012). As a result of the pirates’ transition to the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), piracy attacks and hijackings have inherently 
increased in the region, threatening the safety of India’s booming maritime sector.  
Ninety-five percent of India’s trading by volume is accomplished through 
maritime transport, so the Indian government has turned its focus to developing six more 
ports and opening up the country to one hundred percent Foreign Direct Investment when 
it comes to port construction and maintenance (India Brand Equity Foundation, 2019). 
Therefore, the government of India has it in its best interests to continue to support this 
growing industry, while also protecting it from the dangers of maritime piracy. Under 
UNCLOS and the UN Hostage Treaty, the Indian Navy has the authority to arrest and 
detain individuals that fit the defined criteria of pirates; however, neither outlines exactly 
how a state should try and penalize foreign pirates. Up until 2012, the Indian Penal Code 
had no law on the books regarding piracy whatsoever, so even though Indian ports were 
increasing their security in line with the IMO’s stipulations and if and when incidents 
occurred, they were being reported by the proper officials to organizations like ReCAAP, 
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the Indian government had no basis on how to try pirates. In several cases, pirates were 
tried for armed robbery or attempted murder, but since piracy itself was not litigated as a 
crime, it was nearly impossible to imprison pirates for piracy. The Piracy Bill 2012 was 
India’s domestic solution to this international crisis. According to the Piracy Bill 2012, 
pirates are defined according to UNCLOS’s definition, can be imprisoned for life or 
punished with the death penalty if their actions resulted in death, and do not need to be 
Indian citizens to be charged and condemned (Kumar, 2012). Furthermore, for the first 
time in Indian legal history, the provisions of this legalization go beyond India’s 
territorial waters and extend as far as India’s EEZ.  
According to ReCAAP, 2018 saw India’s lowest number of actual incidents 
(three) since the organization began collecting piracy reports in 2006, which is a sharp 
decrease since the twelve reported incidents of 2016. In addition, there were only 
seventy-six total piracy incidents in Asia last year, which is a twenty-five percent 
decrease since 2017 (ReCAAP ISC Annual Report 2018). Although 2018 may be an 
outlier in recent years for India and other ReCAAP members, clearly someone 
somewhere is doing something right to deter further piracy attempts in this area. India’s 
solution to piracy offers a hybrid model that combines both international and domestic 
approaches to combating piracy. Due to India’s prominent economic and political 
presence, one would expect a country of this caliber to be fully engaged in the 
international community, as it is. However, international institutions cannot change one’s 
geographical location or population size, so the Indian government has to also offer 
domestic solutions like Piracy Bill 2012, increased funding for port security, and a more 
dynamic naval presence in order to further stifle the efforts of pirates. An important 
 37 
distinction should be made here: although India has enacted several domestic policies in 
hopes to decrease piracy in their ports and waters, many of these alterations are a result of 
treaty requirements, rather than purely domestic approaches. For example, even though 
the Piracy Bill 2012 is the law of the land in India, its text is based on UNCLOS, thus it is 
not altogether a unique document or policy, but one rooted in international legislation 
first and foremost. Larger and more prosperous nations, like India, should look to 
increase their membership in international institutions and enact domestic legislation for 
a holistic approach to ending piracy.  
 
Indonesia 
 As the world’s third most populous democracy, the largest archipelagic nation, 
and the largest-Muslim majority nation, Indonesia plays a crucial role on the international 
stage as these factors allow it to have a unique perspective on global affairs. A member 
state of several multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the WTO, as well as 
founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the East Asia Summit, and the 
Organizations of Islamic Cooperation, Indonesia has the potential to be a global 
economic powerhouse, like its neighbors India and China. Nevertheless, as far as piracy 
treaties go, Indonesia is a signatory of only UNCLOS and a member of IMO, not the UN 
Hostage Convention or ReCAAP. Even though they do not receive nearly as significant 
media coverage as their Somalian counterparts, between the years of 2001 and 2010, 
Indonesia and Somalia had roughly the same number of pirate attacks with nine-hundred 
and ninety and nine-hundred and sixty-eight respectively (Hodginkinson, 2014). In 2017, 
Indonesia alone accounted for twenty-percent of all piracy incidents worldwide.   
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 Piracy in Indonesia is a systemic problem for the domestic government for several 
reasons. First off, because Indonesia has the second longest coastline in the world, 
policing logistics are a major hurdle. Even when a piracy threat is legitimately detected, 
there are often not enough policemen or security boats to pursue and detain the 
aggressors that terrorize the Indonesian coastline. Next, another major component of the 
Indonesian piracy complex is that Indonesia is not a member state of ReCAAP, so the 
government is failing to receive not only vital information from its regional counterparts, 
but it is also not sharing the information its agencies have gathered. Indonesia maintains 
that they are not a member state of ReCAAP because Jakarta – Indonesia’s capital – lost 
out to Singapore as the organization’s headquarters, thus citing politics as their argument. 
Nevertheless, information asymmetries lead to varying kinds of bargaining problems and 
have often been the source of regional and global conflicts, which is why multilateral and 
international institutions place information sharing and cooperation as one of their 
foremost goals when establishing institutions of any kind. Finally, probably the most 
difficult dilemma for Indonesia to overcome in regards to piracy is government 
corruption. Out of one hundred and seventy-seven countries, Indonesia is ranked one 
hundred and fourteenth in government corruption (McCauley, 2014). Due to the 
country’s island-based geographical layout, the Indonesian government is inherently 
decentralized, which leaves room for corruption and regional oligarchies to spring up 
among the territories. Across the board, with corruption, comes an uptick of violence and 
criminality, but in Indonesia particularly, some of this criminality takes shape in the form 
of pirates backed by the regional oligarchies, who can provide safe havens and cover 
expenses for the offenders.  
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For years, the Indonesian government focused on other more immediate domestic 
issues, like alleviating piracy and strengthening democracy. However, beginning in the 
mid-2000s, Indonesia began to ramp up its police-based anti-piracy efforts and looked to 
stop piracy at its source, corrupt military and political figures. In 2005, the Indonesian 
government launched Operation GURITA (octopus), which sent over twenty naval 
vessels and aircraft into waters where pirates frequent and resulted in the arrest of several 
piracy gangs. Meanwhile, in 2008, Indonesia opened ten new radar stations along the 
Straits of Malacca (Bradford, 2008). Both of these actions are steps in the right direction 
and prove Indonesia’s resolve to end piracy; however, for the most part, when it comes to 
piracy trials in Indonesia, judges tend to give out more lenient sentences when compared 
to neighboring states. In addition, unlike Great Britain or India, Indonesia has no 
additional piracy law on the books to condemn pirates for the sake of their actions as 
pirates.  
As previously stated, Indonesia is not a member of ReCAAP. However, in 2004 
and 2005, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia catalyzed a trilateral, joint effort to patrol 
the Strait of the Malacca, the “world’s most dangerous waters,” through coordinated 
maritime surface patrols and air surveillance (Bradford, 2008, pp. 482). This newfound 
regional cooperation between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia is a step in the right 
direction to eradicate an issue that threatens all of their economies and citizens’ safety. 
On a similar note, in 2017, India, Malaysia, and the Philippines formalized The Trilateral 
Maritime Patrol arrangement, an agreement which authorized naval personnel from each 
of these countries to patrol the region and run down any pirates or militants in the area 
(Guerra, 2017). This regional treaty overcomes a serious issue facing Indonesian police 
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forces: the inability to chase pirates into another country’s territorial waters. Now that the 
agreement is in play, naval vessels and even aircraft from Indonesia can legally pursue 
assailants into both Malaysian and Philippine waters. Although this agreement is a step in 
the right direction, membership in ReCAAP would allow Indonesia to benefit from more 
regional patrols and better targeting capacity, two factors that have been key to 
ReCAAP’s advantage in eradicating piracy in the Southeast Asian region.  
 
 Summary of Case Studies 
 India and Indonesia both offer unique perspectives into what states are actually 
doing in response to piracy. Rather than relying on only one or the other, India has looked 
to both international institutions and domestic legislation to offer a holistic approach to 
combating piracy in its area. In doing so, the Indian government officials are signaling 
that they view piracy as a serious threat and are willing to do everything they can within 
their state and on the international stage to terminate piracy. In addition, some domestic 
legislation, like the Piracy Bill 2012, finds its roots in international law, so India is not 
only adhering to international and domestic legislation but also allowing for the two to 
coexist. On the other hand, Indonesia makes little to no use of the international 
institutions that are in place and, instead, relies seriously on domestic efforts to rein in 
and apprehend pirates. Recently, Indonesia has collaborated with other regional actors to 
multilaterally approach the problem of piracy, but for the most part, the major driving 
force behind their anti-piracy endeavors are domestically based. As these two countries 
highlight, the issue of piracy and how to counter it is not black and white, but is very 
much so in the gray area between, which is why I would argue that my correlations and 
 41 
regressions yielded no support to my hypothesis. In this thesis, I looked specifically at the 
relationship between piracy and treaty participation, which failed to recognize the 
significance of domestic legislation in conjunction with international involvement. 
Therefore, a more accurate approach may have been to offer a third hypothesis, a hybrid 
model between international and domestic responses, which would take into 
consideration both fronts of the piracy battle.   
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
In writing this thesis, I had hopes that light would be shed on the threat of 
contemporary maritime piracy on the global shipping industry, but above all, I wanted to 
explore what options states had when attempting to terminate or at least decrease the 
presence of piracy in their territorial and regional waters. Due to the correlation between 
piracy and government corruption in a state such as Indonesia, domestic legislation that 
condemns the practice may exist or be possible to enact, but because the local authorities 
are typically the ones faced with charges of corruption, even if these policies existed, it 
would be difficult to enforce. Local leaders that benefit from the actions of pirates will 
continue their efforts so long as the option is there, which is why the solution cannot start 
at the local level but needs to be at the international or supranational one. 
In the spirit of 21st century liberalism, I framed my argument around international 
institutions as the nail in the coffin of piracy, but after further research and analysis, 
international institutions alone may not be the solution I thought they would be. Although 
UNCLOS, the IMO, and the UN Hostages Convention have done plenty to codify 
international law in regards to maritime issues, the topics they cover are considerably 
wide-reaching and simply do not do enough to address piracy specifically. Even if a state 
adhered to the stipulations of these three international institutions, piracy could remain a 
problem as each of them generally outline piracy but do not condemn the actions of the 
pirates themselves or have the mechanisms to hold them accountable. On the other hand, 
because the regional agreements – ReCAAP and the DCoC – are closer “to the ground,” 
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their efforts can more directly address not only piracy, but also concerns that are specific 
to that region. Nevertheless, these agreements were both established less than fifteen 
years ago, so even though the policies they have put in place seem to be working to 
reduce piracy and promote cooperation, it will take more time for the effects to be 
widespread. In addition, if the states where piracy is significant, i.e. Indonesia and 
Somalia, do not ratify these treaties and agree to their stipulations, piracy will continue to 
be a problem as those states are not held accountable or to the same standards as their 
neighbors.  
All of this is not to say that international institutions are not the solution simply 
because the data did not yield the results that I hoped   they would. Rather, I 
wholeheartedly maintain that international institutions are the answer of the future, but in 
today’s isolationist environment, I fear that answer is just not politically viable. Ignoring 
the politics of the international stage, I would argue in line with Bento (2011) that a 
supranational piracy institution or court is the best option for completely eliminating the 
threat of piracy. Because piracy is so intrinsically intertwined with local and regional 
politics, only a body that is completely cut off from these lower levels can effectively 
bring about change. For a body of this level to work, all states, even those that are only 
minutely affected by piracy, would need to join the institution. In addition, each state 
would be granted the opportunity to send a representative who would not only express the 
views of his or her home country but would also play a crucial role in establishing 
mechanisms for enforcement, such as a police force or agency, and some type of judicial 
branch that would decide sentences. Although issues of sovereignty will certainly arise, I 
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have hope that states will put their territorial concerns aside and engage fully in an 
institution that is dedicated solely to eradicating piracy.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A-1 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Deviation P> | t | 
piracyattacks -0.0162933 0.0115782 0.162 
lngdpcap 0.0601977 0.0769978 0.436 
newgoveffect -0.0014721 0.004458 0.742 
demdum 0.1589614 0.1568045 0.313 
_cons 2.617915 0.4853983 0.000 
 
Table A-2 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Deviation P> | t | 
piracyattacks -0.0059751 0.0082757 0.472 
lngdpcap -0.0037454 0.0550349 0.946 
newgoveffect -0.0008724 0.0031864 0.785 
demdum 0.040874 0.1120776 0.716 
_cons 0.3736364 0.3469433 0.284 
 
Table A-3 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Deviation P> | t | 
piracyincidents -0.0145592 0.0088434 0.102 
lngdpcap 0.0594836 0.0765264 0.439 
newgoveffect -0.0016034 0.0044396 0.719 
demdum 0.1562414 0.1561232 0.319 
_cons 2.636679 0.4830037 0.000 
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Table A-4 
Variable  Coefficient Standard Deviation P> | t | 
piracyincidents -0.0055293 0.0063343 0.385 
lngdpcap -0.0042555 0.0548143 0.938 
newgoveffect -0.0009181 0.00318 0.773 
demdum 0.0400357 0.1118279 0.721 
_cons 0.3827405 0.3459659 0.271 
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